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# The genetics of investment biases $\stackrel{\mbox{\tiny\sc tr}}{\to}$

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# ABSTRACT

For a long list of investment "biases," including lack of diversification, excessive trading, and the disposition effect, we find that genetic differences explain up to 45% of the remaining variation across individual investors, after controlling for observable individual characteristics. The evidence is consistent with a view that investment biases are manifestations of innate and evolutionary ancient features of human behavior. We find that work experience with finance reduces genetic predispositions to investment biases. Finally, we find that even genetically identical investors, who grew up in the same family environment, often differ substantially in their investment behaviors due to individual-specific experiences or events.

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# 1. Introduction

The list of investment "biases" that individual investors exhibit is long. Many investors lack diversification and have a preference for familiar investments (French and Poterba, 1991; Huberman, 2001), trade too much (Odean, 1999), are reluctant to realize their losses (Odean, 1998; Dhar and Zhu, 2006), extrapolate recent superior returns (Benartzi, 2001), and have a preference for skewness and lottery-type investments (Kumar, 2009). These behaviors have been partially attributed to various psychological mechanisms: Ambiguity aversion and familiarity for lack of diversification (Ellsberg, 1961; Heath and Tversky, 1991), overconfidence and sensationseeking for excessive trading (Griffin and Tversky, 1992), loss aversion and mental accounting for the reluctance to realize losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Thaler, 1985), representativeness and the hot hands fallacy for excessive extrapolation of past returns (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), and cumulative prospect theory for skewness preferences (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).<sup>1</sup>

While the referenced studies have shown that individual investors, on average, exhibit these investment biases, little research has been devoted to uncovering the origins of these investment biases and the differences across investors. Are investors genetically endowed with certain predispositions that manifest themselves as investment biases? Or do investors exhibit biases as a result of parenting or individual-specific experiences or events? Distinguishing between genetic and environmental sources of investment biases has potentially important implications for the extent to which education and market incentives may be expected to reduce investment biases as well as for the design of public policy (Bernheim, 2009).<sup>2</sup> Evidence of a significant genetic component would also provide empirical support for recent models proposing that behavioral biases could be the outcome of natural selection e.g., Rayo and Becker (2007) and Brennan and Lo (2011), a mechanism that requires that behaviors are at least partly genetically determined.

We use empirical methodology adopted from quantitative behavioral genetics research (Neale and Maes, 2004), which has recently been used also in finance research (e.g., <u>Cesarini, Dawes, Johannesson, Lichtenstein,</u> and Wallace, 2009a; <u>Barnea, Cronqvist, and Siegel, 2010;</u> <u>Cesarini, Johannesson, Lichtenstein, Sandewall, and</u> <u>Wallace, 2010</u>). Our data set from the world's largest twin registry, the Swedish Twin Registry (STR), matched with detailed data on the twins' investment behaviors, enables us to decompose differences across individuals into genetic versus environmental components. This decomposition is based on an intuitive insight: Identical twins share 100% of their genes, while the average proportion of shared genes is only 50% for fraternal twins. If identical twins exhibit more similarity with respect to these investment biases than do fraternal twins, then there is evidence that these behaviors are influenced, at least in part, by genetic factors.

We can summarize our results as follows. First, for a long list of investment biases, we find that genetic differences explain up to 45% of the remaining variation across individual investors, after controlling for observable individual characteristics. Consistent with a view that investment biases are manifestations of innate and evolutionary ancient features of human behavior, we find that the genetic factors that influence investment biases also affect behaviors in other, non-investment, domains. For example, we show that the correlation between a preference for familiar stocks and familiarity preferences in other domains is due to shared genetic influences. While our results are consistent with several behavioral genetic studies that have shown significant heritability of human behavior, they provide the first direct evidence from realworld, non-experimental data that persistent investment biases are to a significant extent determined by genetic endowments. Such evidence provides support for evolutionary arguments that behaviors which manifest themselves as investment biases in today's financial markets have survived because they were advantageous in evolutionary ancient times (e.g., Rayo and Becker, 2007; Brennan and Lo, 2011).

The relative importance of genetic relative to environmental factors is found to vary across different investors. Most importantly, among investors with work experience with finance, we find a significant reduction of the relative amount of genetic variation, which is consistent with practical experience in finance moderating genetic predispositions. We cannot rule out, though, that the selection of profession reduces the relevant genetic variation in this subsample. Controlling for selection, we also investigate the role of general education, measured as years of education, in moderating the relative importance of genetic factors. We do not find that general education reduces the relative importance of genetic factors in explaining investment biases.

Finally, we find that even genetically identical investors who grew up in the same family environment differ substantially in terms of their investment behaviors. Individual-specific environments, experiences, or events must therefore play an important role in shaping individuals' investment behaviors. Examining differences between investment biases of genetically identical investors, we show how genetically informed data, such as twin data used in this study, can be used to better establish the causal impact of individual-specific factors, such as education.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is an overview of related research. Section 3 describes our data sources, reports summary statistics, and defines our measures of investment biases. Section 4 describes our empirical methodology. Sections 5 and 6 report our results and robustness checks. Section 7 concludes and Section 8 outlines some possible directions for future research.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Throughout the paper, we will refer to these behaviors as "biases" because they constitute non-standard preferences and beliefs from the perspective of standard models used in financial economics.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide estimates of the potential welfare losses attributed to any of these behaviors. Some of the referenced papers provide such estimates.

#### 2. Overview of related research

While it is beyond the scope of this paper to review the vast literature on the evolution of behavior, we note that social scientists have recently proposed that the psychological mechanisms behind the investment biases we study in this paper could be the outcome of natural selection (e.g., Rayo and Becker, 2007; McDermott, Fowler, and Smirnov, 2008; Brennan and Lo, 2011; Johnson and Fowler, 2011).<sup>3</sup> These studies argue that behaviors that represent investment biases in today's environment, such as for example a preference for familiarity or the extrapolation of trends, might have been advantageous in evolutionary ancient times, in the sense that these behaviors conferred greater "fitness," i.e., reproductive success, and therefore became more common in the population.<sup>4</sup> Unless such behaviors lead to a *reproductive* disadvantage in modern times, they can persist and shape individuals' investment decisions. Rayo and Becker (2007, p. 304), for example, conclude:

"[W]hen talking about fitness-maximizing [utility] functions, we refer to functions that optimized genetic multiplication during hunter-gatherer times (before agriculture and animal domestication were developed). In modern times, on the other hand, we presumably share most of the innate characteristics of our huntergatherer ancestors. But since the technological landscape has changed so rapidly since the rise of agriculture, our [utility] functions need no longer optimally promote the present multiplication of our genes."

A necessary condition for evolutionary models of behavioral biases is that at least some of the variation in the relevant behaviors is due to genetic differences between individuals. Before presenting our findings on the importance of genetic variation specifically with respect to investment biases, we briefly discuss the existing evidence on genetic determinants of the psychological mechanisms that underlie investment biases. In Table 1, we list for each investment bias the related psychological mechanisms and report twin and gene candidate studies that relate these mechanisms to genetic variation across individuals.

Diversification and Home Bias. Investors often diversify their portfolios less than is recommended by standard models. For example, they overweight stocks from their home market (e.g., <u>French and Poterba, 1991</u>). Ambiguity aversion and familiarity (e.g., <u>Heath and Tversky, 1991</u>; Fox and <u>Tversky, 1995</u>) are potential explanations, but the home bias is not easy to explain (e.g., <u>Lewis, 1999</u>). The recent gene association study by Chew, Ebstein, and Zhong (2011) identifies several specific genes that affect ambiguity aversion and familiarity.

*Turnover*: One important stylized facts about individual investors is that they often trade too much (e.g., <u>Odean</u>, <u>1999; Barber and Odean</u>, <u>2000; Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean</u>, <u>2009</u>). Excessive trading has been found to be related to individual characteristics that are partly genetic, such as overconfidence and sensation-seeking (e.g., <u>Barber and Odean</u>, <u>2001; Grinblatt and Keloharju</u>, <u>2009</u>). Twin studies have documented that both of these behaviors are partially genetic (<u>Cesarini</u>, Johannesson, Lichtenstein, and <u>Wallace</u>, <u>2009</u>); <u>Fulker</u>, <u>Eysenck</u>, and <u>Zuckerman</u>, <u>1980</u>). More recent research links sensation-seeking to specific genes (Derringer, Krueger, Dick, Saccone, Grucza, Agrawal, Lin, Almasy, Edenberg, Foroud, Nurnberger, Hesselbrock, Kramer, Kuperman, Porjesz, Schuckit, and Bierut, <u>2010</u>).

Disposition effect: Shefrin and Statman (1985) argue that investors are more likely to sell stocks with a gain than with a loss. The disposition has been linked to loss aversion, prospect theory, and narrow framing. A recent study by Zhong, Israel, Xue, Sham, Ebstein, and Chew (2009) identifies specific genes that affect the concavity and convexity of the prospect theory value function in the gain and loss domains. Furthermore, loss aversion has been found also in animals that are genetically close to humans. Chen, Lakshminarayanan, and Santos (2006) show that capuchin monkeys exhibit loss aversion: "[L]oss aversion is an innate and evolutionarily ancient feature of human preferences, a function of decision-making systems that evolved before the common ancestors of capuchins and humans diverged" (Chen, Lakshminarayanan, and Santos, 2006, p. 520). Twin studies have also documented that loss aversion is partially genetic (e.g., Cesarini, Johannesson, Magnusson, and Wallace, 2012).

Performance chasing: Individual investors often extrapolate recent good stock or fund performance even when it shows little to no persistence (e.g., Patel, Zeckhauser, and Hendricks, 1991; Benartzi, 2001). In their work on representativeness, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) find that people expect that a sequence of outcomes generated by a random process will resemble the essential characteristics of that process even when the sequence is short. Griffin and Tversky (1992) provide an extension documenting that people focus on the strength or extremeness of the evidence with insufficient regard of its credence, predictability, and weight. Two recent twin studies using experimental data reach opposite conclusions with respect to the genetics of representativeness (Cesarini, Johannesson, Magnusson, and Wallace, 2012; Simonson and Sela, 2011). We are not aware of existing research that directly links excessive extrapolation to specific genes.

*Skewness preference*: Investors often exhibit a preference for positive skewness, i.e., lottery-type investments (e.g., <u>Kumar, 2009</u>). Such behavior is expected if investors make decisions based on cumulative prospect theory (<u>Tversky and</u> <u>Kahneman, 1992</u>; <u>Barberis and Huang, 2008</u>). Twin studies have found that the preference to gamble is partially genetic (e.g., <u>Slutske, Eisen, True, Lyons, Goldberg, and Tsuang, 2000</u>). Furthermore, the recent gene association study by <u>Zhong,</u> <u>Israel, Xue, Sham, Ebstein, and Chew (2009)</u> finds that a specific gene results in a preference for gambles with a small probability of a very large payoff.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Other models of the natural selection of preferences and human behaviors include Rogers (1994), <u>Waldman (1994)</u>, <u>Robson (1996)</u>, and <u>Netzer (2009)</u>. Some of these papers explain why biases may have evolved and survived natural selection (e.g., <u>Waldman, 1994</u>). Some evolutionary models have appeared in financial economics research (e.g., Luo, 1998; Hirshleifer and Luo, 2001).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> While evolutionary models of behavioral biases offer an explanation why these biases may exist, they do not imply that all individuals exhibit these biases. In general, different behaviors can exist in a population as long as they lead to similar reproductive success.

#### H. Cronqvist, S. Siegel / Journal of Financial Economics 113 (2014) 215-234

# 218

#### Table 1

The genetic basis of investment biases. This table provides information on existing evidence from behavioral genetics with respect to investment behaviors examined in this paper.

Investment behavior	Psychological mechanism(s)	Gene(s)	Empirical evidence
Insufficient diversification	Ambiguity aversion	DRD5 (microsatellite marker); ESR2 (CA	Chew, Ebstein, and Zhong (2011)
	Familiarity	SLC6A4 (5-HTTLPR indel)	Chew, Ebstein, and Zhong (2011)
Excessive trading	Overconfidence Sensation-seeking	Multiple SNPs in 4 dopamine genes	Twin study design: Cesarini, Johannesson, Lichtenstein, and Wallace (2009b) Derringer, Krueger, Dick, Saccone, Grucza, Agrawal, Lin, Almasy, Edenberg, Foroud, Nurnberger, Hesselbrock, Kramer, Kuperman, Porjesz, Schuckit, and Bierut (2010) Twin study design: Fulker, Eysenck, and <u>Zuckerman (1980)</u>
Disposition effect	Prospect theory	9-repeat vs. 10-repeat allele of DAT1 10-repeat vs. 12-repeat allele of STin2	Zhong, Israel, Xue, Sham, Ebstein, and Chew (2009) Zhong, Israel, Xue, Sham, Ebstein, and Chew (2009)
	Loss aversion		Loss aversion in capuchin monkeys (Chen, Lakshminarayanan, and Santos 2006)
	Mental accounting/ Framing		Narrow framing in capuchin monkeys (Lakshminarayanan, Chen, and Santos, 2011)
Performance chasing	Excessive extrapolation Hot hands fallacy		Twin study design: Cesarini, Johannesson, Magnusson, and Wallace (2012)
	Representativeness		Twin study design: Cesarini, Johannesson, Magnusson, and Wallace (2012) and Simonson and Sela (2011)
Skewness preference	Cumulative prospect theory	Monoamine oxidase A (4 repeat)	Zhong, Israel, Xue, Sham, Ebstein, and Chew (2009)
	rr- meory	(r)	Twin study design: Slutske, Eisen, True, Lyons, Goldberg, and Tsuang (2000)

# 3. Data

# 3.1. Data sources

Our data set is constructed by matching a large number of twins from the Swedish Twin Registry (STR), the world's largest twin registry, with data from individual tax filings and other databases by Statistics Sweden. In Sweden, twins are registered at birth, and the STR collects additional data through in-depth interviews.<sup>5</sup> Importantly, STR's data provide us with the zygosity of each twin pair: Identical or "monozygotic" (MZ) twins are genetically identical, while fraternal or "dizygotic" (DZ) twins are genetically different, and share on average 50% of their genes.<sup>6</sup> Until 2007, taxpayers in Sweden were subject to a wealth tax. Prior to the abolishment of this tax, all Swedish banks, brokerage firms, and other financial institutions were required by law to report to the Swedish Tax Authority information about individuals' portfolios (i.e., stocks, bonds, mutual funds, derivatives, and other securities) held as of December 31 and also all sales transactions during the year.

We have matched the twins with portfolio and sales transaction data between 1999 and 2007, providing us with detailed information on investment behavior. For each individual, our data set contains all securities held at the end of the year (identified by each security's International Security Identification Number (ISIN)), the number of each security held, the dividends received during the year, and the end of the year value. We also have data on which securities were sold over the year, and in the case of stocks, the number of securities sold and the sales price.<sup>7</sup> Security-level data have been collected from several sources, including Bloomberg, Datastream, Morningstar, SIX Telekurs, Standard & Poor's, and the Swedish Investment Fund Association.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> STR's databases are organized by birth cohort. The Screening Across Lifespan Twin, or "SALT," database contains data on twins born 1886–1958. The Swedish Twin Studies of Adults: Genes and Environment database, or "STAGE," contains data on twins born 1959–1985. In addition to twin pairs, twin identifiers, and zygosity status, the databases contain variables based on STR's telephone interviews (for SALT), completed 1998–2002, and combined telephone interviews and Internet surveys (for STAGE), completed 2005–2006. For further details about STR, we refer to Lichtenstein, Sullivan, Cnattingius, Gatz, Johansson, Carlstrom, Bjork, Svartengren, Wolk, Klareskog, de Faire, Schalling, Palmgren, and Pedersen (2006).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Zygosity is based on questions about intrapair similarities in childhood. One of the questions was: Were you and your twin partner during childhood "as alike as two peas in a pod" or were you "no more alike than siblings in general" with regard to appearance? STR has validated this method with DNA analysis as having 98% accuracy on a subsample of

<sup>(</sup>footnote continued)

twins. For twin pairs for which DNA has been collected, zygosity status is based on DNA analysis.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Sales transaction data are not available for 2001 and 2002, and we do not have the exact dates (within a given year) of any of the sales transactions in our data set.

#### 3.2. Sample selection and summary statistics

We follow prior research on investment biases by analyzing equity investments, i.e., individual stocks as well as equity and mixed mutual funds, with a particular focus on individual stocks. We therefore exclude individuals who do not participate in equity markets. Our empirical methodology also requires that we exclude incomplete pairs of twins.

We have 15,208 adult twin pairs in which each twin has at least one year of non-missing equity investment data. Panel A of Table 2 reports summary statistics for our data set, which includes 30,416 individuals. Opposite-sex twins are the most common (37%); identical male twins are the least common (13%). The distribution in the table is consistent with what would be expected from large samples of twins (e.g., Bortolus, Parazzini, Chatenoud, Benzi, Bianchi, and Marini, 1999).

Table 2 Panel B reports summary statistics separately for identical and fraternal twins. Socioeconomic characteristics are averaged over those years an investor is in our data set.<sup>8</sup> While identical and fraternal twins are relatively similar with respect to socioeconomic characteristics, we observe substantial cross-sectional variation. We find that the average (median) investor holds about four (two) equity securities with a combined value of about \$20,000 (\$4,000) in the portfolio.<sup>9</sup> About 80% hold at least one equity mutual fund, and about 40% hold at least one stock. Finally, we have verified that the socioeconomic characteristics of the twins in our sample are similar to non-twins of the same age and gender who participate in the equity market (not tabulated).

#### 3.3. Measures of investment biases

In this subsection, we define our measures of investment behaviors. Appendix Table A1 reports detailed definitions and Table 3 reports summary statistics for direct stock holdings as well as all equity investments consisting of direct stock as well as mutual fund holdings.

For direct stock holdings, we measure *Diversification* as the number of distinct stocks held in an individual's portfolio at the end of a given year. For holdings of stocks and mutual funds, we follow Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2009) and define *Diversification* as the proportion of equity investments invested in mutual funds as opposed to individual stocks. To reduce measurement error, we calculate the equally weighted average *Diversification* across all years the individual is in the data set. Summary statistics in Table 3 show that the average investor with direct holdings of stocks holds about three stocks, while across all investors about 70% of their equity portfolio is invested in mutual funds. The standard deviations of about 4% for the number of stocks and about 40% for the proportion invested in mutual funds are evidence of substantial cross-sectional variation.

We measure *Home bias* by the average proportion invested in Swedish securities. Table 3 shows that for individual stocks the average home bias is 94%, but drops to about 50% once we include mutual fund investments. Cross-sectional variation exists again in both cases, with standard deviations of about 15% in case of individual stocks and 30% in case of all equity investments.

We measure *Turnover*, i.e., an individual's propensity to trade and turnover the portfolio, following Barber and <u>Odean (2000, 2001</u>). Specifically, for direct stock holdings, we divide, for each individual investor and year, the sales volume (in Swedish krona) during the year by the value of directly held stocks at the beginning of the year. Since we do not have sales prices for mutual funds, we also construct a turnover measure using the number of sales transactions during the year divided by the number of equity securities in the investor's portfolio at the beginning of the year. For each measure, we compute the average turnover using all years with available data.

Table 3 reports that for the average investor in our data who holds individual stocks, annual (sales) turnover is about 20%, a magnitude similar to that reported by Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sundén (2003) for a large set of retirement savings accounts in the U.S., and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) for a large sample of individual investors in Finland. Even though many investors in our data trade relatively little, substantial variation exists, as indicated by the crosssectional standard deviation of about 33%. Some of the investors in our data set therefore likely trade too much, as in, e.g., Odean (1999). That is, they trade more than what is needed to rebalance their portfolios or to satisfy liquidity needs. To control for cross-sectional variation in such reasons to trade, we follow Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) and control for socioeconomic characteristics that may correlate with rebalancing needs and liquidity demands. The remaining variation may then be considered variation in "excessive" trading.

We measure the *Disposition effect* in the spirit of Odean (1998) and Dhar and Zhu (2006). Specifically, at the end of each year during which we observe a sales transaction, we classify securities in an investor's portfolio as winners or losers based on the security's price relative to the approximate price at which the investor acquired the security.<sup>10</sup> Using data across all years with sales transactions, we calculate for each investor the proportion of gains realized to the total number of realized and unrealized gains (PGR) as well as the proportion of losses realized to total losses (PLR). The larger the difference between PGR and PLR, the more reluctant a given investor is to realize losses.

Table 3 reveals that we are able to calculate the *Disposition effect* only for a subset of investors. The reduction in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The educational variables are based on the maximum, not an average.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> We use the average end-of-year exchange rate 1999–2007 of 8.0179 Swedish krona per U.S. dollar to convert summary statistics. When we estimate models in Section 5, all values are in Swedish krona, i.e., not converted to dollars. In terms of size, the portfolios in our data set are comparable to those in other data sets of a broad set of individual investors. For example, in <u>Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009</u>), the average (median) investor holds about two (one) equity securities with a combined value of about EUR 24,600 (EUR 1,600) in the portfolio.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Since we do not observe the exact price at which an investor acquires a given security, we use the end-of-year price (averaged between the year before an acquisition and the year of the acquisition) as the reference price.

#### 220

### H. Cronqvist, S. Siegel / Journal of Financial Economics 113 (2014) 215-234

# Table 2

Summary statistics.

Panel A provides information on the number of identical and non-identical twins used in this study. Panel B provides summary statistics for several socioeconomic characteristics and portfolio characteristics, separately for identical and non-identical twins. All variables are defined in detail in Appendix Table A1.

Panel A: Number of twins by zygosity and gender								
	All twins		Identical twins		Fraternal twins			
		Male	Female	Total	Same sex: Male	Same sex: Female	Opposite sex	Total
Number of twins ( <i>N</i> ) Fraction (%)	30,416 100%	4,066 13%	5,206 17%	9,272 30%	4,522 15%	5,326 18%	11,296 37%	21,144 70%

Panel B: Socioeconomic characteristics and equity portfolio characteristics

	All twins	Identical twins		Fraternal twins			
Variable	Ν	Mean	Median	Std. dev.	Mean	Median	Std. dev.
Age	30,416	47.08	48.00	17.64	53.06	55.00	15.51
Less than high school	30,416	0.15	0.00	0.35	0.20	0.00	0.40
High school	30,416	0.22	0.00	0.41	0.26	0.00	0.44
College or more	30,416	0.58	1.00	0.49	0.47	0.00	0.50
No education data available	30,416	0.06	0.00	0.23	0.06	0.00	0.24
Married	30,416	0.46	0.00	0.50	0.54	1.00	0.50
Disposable income (USD)	30,416	31,379	25,476	27,592	35,203	27,678	35,449
Financial assets (USD)	30,416	40,759	14,537	155,296	48,062	17,342	442,298
Total assets (USD)	30,416	124,351	71,883	252,478	142,603	83,504	576,198
Total debt (USD)	30,416	31,802	16,020	68,330	30,396	13,759	149,778
Net worth (USD)	30,416	92,549	42,961	223,277	112,207	56,417	516,665
Number of stocks and equity mutual funds	30,416	3.56	2.33	3.80	3.62	2.25	3.97
Value of stocks and equity mutual funds (USD)	30,416	16,841	3,662	109,292	24,815	4,159	663,773
Number of stocks	12,378	3.32	1.89	3.91	3.42	1.89	4.15
Value of stocks (USD)	12,378	22,558	2,825	163,360	29,218	2,819	543,596
Number of equity mutual funds	23,870	2.41	1.89	1.84	2.34	1.80	1.86
Value of equity mutual funds (USD)	23,870	7,018	2,059	20,160	7,788	2,292	17,304

#### Table 3

#### Investment behaviors.

This table reports summary statistics for the main measure of investment behavior, *Diversification*, *Home bias*, *Turnover*, *Disposition effect*, *Performance chasing*, and *Skewness preferences* as well as the *Investment bias index*. *Diversification* and *Turnover* are measured differently for stocks and stocks and equity mutual funds. See Appendix Table A1 for a detailed definition of all variables.

	All twins	Identical twins			Fraternal twins		
Variable	Ν	Mean	Median	Std. dev.	Mean	Median	Std. dev.
Stocks							
Diversification	12,378	3.32	1.89	3.91	3.42	1.89	4.15
Home bias	12,378	0.94	1.00	0.16	0.94	1.00	0.15
Turnover	11,508	0.20	0.03	0.35	0.17	0.02	0.33
Disposition effect	782	0.04	0.00	0.38	0.05	0.00	0.47
Performance chasing	6,672	0.15	0.00	0.22	0.14	0.00	0.22
Skewness preference	12,378	0.04	0.00	0.10	0.03	0.00	0.10
Investment bias index	12,378	4.67	5.00	1.49	4.58	5.00	1.43
Stocks and equity mutual funds							
Diversification	30,416	0.70	0.93	0.38	0.67	0.89	0.39
Home bias	30,416	0.51	0.47	0.30	0.53	0.49	0.31
Turnover	28,108	0.27	0.17	0.38	0.25	0.14	0.37
Disposition effect	3,086	0.02	0.00	0.43	0.02	0.00	0.43
Performance chasing	25,530	0.10	0.00	0.16	0.10	0.00	0.16
Skewness preference	30,416	0.05	0.00	0.10	0.06	0.00	0.10

sample size is due to missing information on purchase prices for securities that are present in an investor's portfolio before 1999, the first year of our sample period, as well as infrequent trading by some investors. The average investor exhibits a disposition effect of about 4% with respect to direct equity holdings and of about 2% when including mutual funds. Most importantly, given that the PGR - PLR difference is bounded by -1 and +1, the standard deviation of about

40% shows that there is significant variation across individuals with respect to the reluctance to realize losses.

We measure Performance chasing by an individual's propensity to purchase securities that have performed well in the recent past. More specifically, each year we sort stocks and equity mutual funds separately into return deciles using the returns during the year. For each investor and year with net increases in holdings of stocks or mutual funds, we calculate the fraction of purchased securities with returns in the top two deciles. The higher that fraction, the more the individual chases performance by overweighting securities with higher recent performance. Performance chasing is the average fraction over all years with net acquisitions of equity securities. Table 3 shows, on average, about 10–15% of the securities acquired have shown relatively strong recent performance. Since not all investors make net acquisitions during our sample period, Performance chasing is only available for a subset of investors.

We measure an individual's *Skewness preference* as in Kumar (2009). For each investor and year we calculate the proportion of the portfolio that is invested in "lottery" securities, i.e., securities with a below median price as well as above median idiosyncratic volatility and above median skewness. *Skewness preference* is the fraction of lottery securities averaged over all years with portfolio data. Table 3 shows that, on average, about 3–4% of an investor's portfolio is held in lottery securities.

To reduce the dimensionality of some of our analysis, we also construct an index that summarizes the above investment behaviors for each investor with holdings of individual stocks. Specifically, for each of the investment behaviors, we assign a value of zero (no bias), one, or two (most biased), depending on the observed level. For example, for the Disposition effect, we assign two to investors with a disposition effect over 40% (one standard deviation above zero), one to investors with a strictly positive disposition effect, and zero otherwise. Appendix Table A1 provides a detailed description of the construction of the *Investment bias index*. If for a given investor, a behavior is missing, we use the median behavior to assign the bias index component (zero, one, or two). An individual's Investment bias index is the sum across all the investment behaviors and takes on values between zero and 12.

# 4. Empirical methodology

To decompose the cross-sectional variation in investment behaviors into genetic and environmental components, we model each measure of an investment bias  $y_{ij}$  for twin j (1 or 2) of pair i as a function of observable socioeconomic characteristics  $\mathbf{X}_{ij}$  as well as three unobserved effects. We assume that  $y_{ij}$  is a function of an additive genetic effect,  $a_{ij}$ , an effect of the environment common to both twins (e.g., parenting),  $c_i$ , and an individual-specific effect,  $e_{ij}$ , also capturing idiosyncratic measurement error:

$$y_{ij} = f(\mathbf{X}_{ij}, a_{ij}, c_i, e_{ij}). \tag{1}$$

We assume initially that  $a_{ij}$ ,  $c_i$ , and  $e_{ij}$  are uncorrelated with one another and across twin pairs and normally distributed with zero means and variances  $\sigma_a^2$ ,  $\sigma_c^2$ , and  $\sigma_e^2$ , respectively, so that the total residual variance  $\sigma^2$  is the sum of the three variance components. We later model gene-environment interactions by allowing  $a_{ij}$ ,  $c_i$ , and  $e_{ij}$  to vary with specific, observable experiences or circumstances.

Identifying variation due to  $a_{ij}$ ,  $c_i$ , and  $e_{ij}$  separately is possible due to constraints on the covariances. These constraints are motivated by the genetic similarity of twins as well as assumptions of their upbringing and other aspects of their common environment. Consider two twin pairs i=1,2 with twins j=1,2 in each pair, where the first is a pair of identical twins and the second is a pair of fraternal twins. The genetic effects are  $a = (a_{11}, a_{12}, a_{12}, a_{13}, a_{$  $a_{21}, a_{22})'$ . Analogously, the common and individualspecific environmental effects are  $c = (c_{11}, c_{12}, c_{21}, c_{22})^{\prime}$ and  $e = (e_{11}, e_{12}, e_{21}, e_{22})'$ . Identical and fraternal twin pairs differ in their genetic similarity. Identical twins are genetically identical, and the correlation between  $a_{11}$  and  $a_{12}$  is set to one. Fraternal twins share on average only 50% of their genes, such that the correlation between  $a_{21}$  and  $a_{22}$ is 0.5. For both identical and fraternal twin pairs, an equal effect of the common environment is assumed. As a result, we use the following covariance matrices:

$$\begin{aligned} \operatorname{Cov}(a) &= \sigma_a^2 \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1/2 \\ 0 & 0 & 1/2 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \quad \operatorname{Cov}(c) &= \sigma_c^2 \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \\ \operatorname{Cov}(e) &= \sigma_e^2 \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}. \end{aligned}$$

For the measures of investment biases in this study, we assume that f is a linear function:

$$y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta \mathbf{X}_{ij} + a_{ij} + c_i + e_{ij}, \tag{2}$$

where  $\beta_0$  is an intercept term and  $\beta$  measures the effects of the observable socioeconomic characteristics ( $\mathbf{X}_{ij}$ ), e.g., age, education, income, and wealth. We use maximum likelihood to estimate the model using Mplus (Muthén and Muthén, 2010). Reported standard errors are bootstrapped from 1,000 resamples.

Finally, we calculate the variance components *A*, *C*, and *E*. *A* is the proportion of the total residual variance in an investment bias that is due to an additive genetic factor:

$$A = \frac{\sigma_a^2}{\sigma_a^2 + \sigma_c^2 + \sigma_e^2}$$

The proportions attributable to the common environment (C) and individual-specific environmental effects (E) are computed analogously.

#### 5. Results

We first compare correlations between genetically identical investors with correlations between related, but genetically non-identical investors. Such a comparison provides intuitive evidence on the importance of latent genetic factors. We then provide formal estimation results from decomposing investment biases into genetic and environmental variation. Finally, we perform a large number of robustness checks.

■ Identical twins ■ Fraternal twins ■ Fraternal twins - same sex ■ Fraternal twins - opposite sex



**Fig. 1.** Correlations by genetic similarity. This figure reports Pearson correlation coefficients for Diversification, Home bias, Disposition effect, Performance chasing, Turnover, and Skewness preference between twins for different types of twin pairs. Investment behaviors are calculated using holdings and transactions of direct stock holdings only. All variables are defined in Appendix Table A1.

### 5.1. Evidence from correlations

For each investment behavior defined previously, Fig. 1 reports correlations between identical twins as well as sameand opposite-sex fraternal twins. We draw several conclusions from the evidence. First, for each measure, we find that the correlation is significantly greater between identical relative to fraternal twins. This difference indicates that to some extent, investors display more or less of a given investment bias due to their genetic make-up. On average, the correlation between identical twins is about twice the correlation between fraternal twins. Second, the correlations for same-sex fraternal twins is generally larger than those for opposite-sex twins. This result suggests that gender affects investment behaviors. In our empirical models below, we will therefore control for gender. In addition, we will provide a robustness check that excludes opposite-sex twins. Finally, we note that the correlation for identical twins is between 25% and 50%, i.e., significantly different from one, suggesting that individualspecific experiences and events are also important for the understanding of why investors exhibit investment biases.

# 5.2. Empirical decomposition of investment biases

We use the model in Eq. (2) to empirically decompose the variation in investment behaviors across individuals into genetic and environmental components. In Panel A of Table 4, we report results from a model that only controls for gender and age which explain very little of the variation in investment behaviors. Thus, most of the variation remains unexplained. This unexplained variation is decomposed into genetic and environmental components. For each component, we report its relative contribution to the unexplained variation of each investment behavior. *A* denotes genetic variation, while *C* and *E* denote common and individual-specific environmental variation.

The evidence suggests that variation across individual investors with respect to all six investment biases examined reflects to a significant extent genetic differences between investors. Genetic factors seem to be particularly influential in determining *Diversification* and *Home bias*, where they account for around 45% of the unexplained variation. For the remaining behaviors, genetic variation still accounts for between a quarter and a third of the variation. That is, individuals are to a significant extent born with predispositions that later in life and under the conditions typically experienced by an investor in our data set manifest themselves in the investment biases we examine in this paper. The findings also suggest that at least 55% of the unexplained variation in investment behaviors is due to environmental factors, represented by the C and E components. Almost all of the environmental variation reflects individual-specific experiences, circumstances, events, and possibly measurement error.<sup>11</sup> The C component is insignificant suggesting that upbringing or other aspects of the common environment do not affect investment biases. That is, the notion that children learn investment biases from their parents is inconsistent with the data.<sup>12</sup>

Wealthier, more educated, and generally more sophisticated investors often make better financial decisions and exhibit fewer investment biases (e.g., Agnew, 2006; Dhar and Zhu, 2006; Kumar, 2009; Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini, 2009). It is possible that certain frictions, such as transaction costs, are less binding for these investors or that these investors have access to better financial advice. At the same time, they likely have superior cognitive abilities which have also been shown to lower investment biases (Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Linnainmaa, 2011, 2012). Importantly, some of the variation in these characteristics, i.e., wealth, education, and, in particular, IQ, is due to genetic differences across investors (see, e.g., <u>Bouchard and</u> McGue, 1981; Davies, Tenesa, Payton, Yang, Harris,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Since our data set comes from the Swedish Tax Agency, which in turn obtains the data directly from financial institutions, reporting errors should be relatively rare. To reduce measurement error, we use whenever possible time-series averages (over a period up to nine years) of annually measured investment behaviors.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> The evidence of an insignificant *C* component is consistent with evidence from behavioral genetics research (e.g., Bouchard, Lykken, McGue, Segal, and <u>Tellegen, 1990</u>) and recent research on risk preferences (e.g., <u>Barnea, Cronqvist, and Siegel, 2010;</u> <u>Cesarini, Johannesson, Lichtenstein, Sandewall, and Wallace, 2010</u>).

### Table 4

Decomposition of investment behaviors.

This table reports results from maximum likelihood estimation. The difference investment behaviors are modeled as linear functions of observable socioeconomic variables and random effects representing additive genetic effects (*A*), shared environmental effects (*C*), as well as an individual-specific error (*E*). For each estimated model, we report the coefficient estimates for the socioeconomic variables, the *Fraction of variance unexplained*, i.e., the amount of total variation that cannot be explained by the observable independent variables, and the fraction of this unexplained variance that is due to unobserved genetic and environmental effects (*A* Share – for the additive genetics effect, *C* Share – for common environmental effect, *E* Share – for the individual-specific environmental effect) as well as the corresponding bootstrapped standard errors (1,000 resamples). Only direct stock holdings are considered in the measurement of the different investment behaviors. Panels A and B differ only with respect to the included control variables. All variables are defined in Appendix Table A1. *N* provides the number of observations used in each estimation.

### Panel A: Controlling for gender and age

Variable	Diver- sification	Home bias	Turnover	Disposition effect	Performance chasing	Skewness preference		
Intercept	1.916	0.912	0.152	-0.146	0.126	0.012		
-	0.344	0.017	0.031	0.161	0.030	0.008		
Male	0.553	0.011	0.078	-0.038	0.026	0.012		
	0.074	0.003	0.006	0.034	0.005	0.002		
Age	0.220	0.010	0.017	0.098	0.012	0.013		
	0.151	0.007	0.012	0.064	0.012	0.003		
Age-squared	0.001	-0.001	-0.003	-0.010	-0.002	-0.002		
	0.016	0.001	0.001	0.006	0.001	0.000		
Fraction of unexplained variance	0.992	0.990	0.977	1.000	0.989	1.000		
A Share	0.437	0.456	0.254	0.294	0.303	0.279		
	0.099	0.053	0.027	0.135	0.091	0.051		
C Share	0.091	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.102	0.000		
	0.066	0.028	0.000	0.057	0.066	0.029		
E Share	0.471	0.544	0.746	0.706	0.595	0.721		
	0.043	0.037	0.027	0.105	0.038	0.034		
Ν	12,378	12,378	11,508	782	6,672	12,378		
Panel B: Controlling for socioeconomic characteristics								

Variable	Diver- sification	Home bias	Turnover	Disposition effect	Performance chasing	Skewness preference
						_
Intercept	-7.780	0.938	-0.265	-0.482	0.014	-0.095
	1.216	0.035	0.073	0.384	0.060	0.024
Male	0.210	0.013	0.076	-0.055	0.024	0.010
	0.068	0.003	0.006	0.036	0.006	0.002
Age	-0.698	0.016	0.025	0.098	0.015	0.013
	0.151	0.007	0.013	0.067	0.013	0.003
Age-squared	0.053	-0.001	-0.004	-0.010	-0.003	-0.002
	0.015	0.001	0.001	0.006	0.001	0.000
High school	0.116	0.001	0.021	0.000	-0.016	-0.001
	0.105	0.004	0.010	0.061	0.010	0.003
College or more	0.512	-0.013	0.029	-0.068	-0.027	0.001
	0.113	0.004	0.009	0.045	0.009	0.003
No education data available	0.027	-0.008	0.009	-0.080	-0.015	0.005
	0.081	0.003	0.007	0.034	0.007	0.002
Married	-0.086	-0.002	-0.005	-0.017	-0.013	0.003
	0.087	0.003	0.008	0.038	0.007	0.002
Second net worth quartile indicator	0.458	-0.006	-0.031	-0.052	0.006	-0.003
	0.060	0.004	0.010	0.067	0.009	0.003
Third net worth quartile indicator	0.979	-0.014	-0.051	-0.029	0.003	-0.008
	0.080	0.004	0.010	0.069	0.010	0.003
Highest net worth quartile indicator	2.862	-0.026	-0.055	-0.042	-0.006	-0.010
	0.108	0.004	0.010	0.065	0.009	0.003
Log of disposable income	0.939	-0.002	0.033	0.039	0.012	0.009
	0.111	0.002	0.006	0.033	0.005	0.002
Turnover (sales)				0.008		
				0.008		
Number of holdings				-0.003		
				0.002		

#### H. Cronqvist, S. Siegel / Journal of Financial Economics 113 (2014) 215-234

### Table 4 (continued)

Panel B: Controlling for socioeconomic characteristics

Variable	Diver- sification	Home bias	Turnover	Disposition effect	Performance chasing	Skewness preference
Fraction of unexplained variance	0.868	0.990	0.969	0.979	0.989	0.967
A Share	0.453	0.452	0.251	0.272	0.311	0.275
	0.084	0.053	0.029	0.127	0.091	0.050
C Share	0.030	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.095	0.000
	0.052	0.028	0.007	0.045	0.065	0.028
E Share	0.516	0.548	0.749	0.728	0.594	0.725
	0.042	0.037	0.027	0.109	0.039	0.034
Ν	12,378	12,378	11,508	782	6,672	12,378

Liewald, Ke, Le Hellard, Christoforou, Luciano, McGhee, Lopez, Gow, Corley, Redmond, Fox, Haggarty, Whalley, McNeill, and Goddard, 2011; Behrman and Taubman, 1989; Cronqvist and Siegel, 2011). To rule out that our findings with respect to the genetic origins of behavioral biases reflect genetic variation in these characteristics, we repeat the analysis controlling for several of these socioeconomic characteristics. In particular, in addition to age and gender, we control for education, marital status, wealth, and income.<sup>13</sup> We do not have data on cognitive abilities, but several of the included characteristics, in particular education and wealth, have been shown to be correlated with measures of IQ. The results in Panel B of Table 4 confirm that, in particular, education and wealth are often associated with lower investment biases. At the same time, the additional controls explain relatively little of the variation in investment biases. As a result, decomposing the remaining unexplained variation yields very similar results as in Panel A.

Finally, in Table 5, we repeat our analysis for investment behaviors measured across all equity investments, including mutual funds. While much of the existing literature in finance has focused on individual investors' choices with respect to individual stocks, many investors invest in mutual funds as well. It is possible that genetic predispositions are moderated by delegating mainly the selection of specific assets to an outside fund manager. We re-estimate the models previously estimated for stock investments only and find that the relative importance of genetic factors as captured by the A components is lower than what we found for the case of direct stock holdings, but only slightly so. The A component ranges between 16% and 38%, depending on the investment behavior. We conclude that genetic differences affect preference or belief differences with respect to direct as well as indirect or delegated equity investments.

# 5.3. Robustness

### 5.3.1. Same-sex twins

We noted in Fig. 1 that the correlations for same-sex fraternal twins are generally greater than those for opposite-

sex twins. A concern is that including opposite-sex twins in our analysis results in an upward bias of the relative importance of genetic factors, as captured by A, as identical twins always have the same sex. As a robustness check, we re-estimate the models for same-sex twins only. Panel A of Table 6 shows that our results are essentially unaltered compared to the previously reported estimates.<sup>14</sup>

### 5.3.2. Model misspecification

Some of the reported *C* components in Table 4 are exactly zero, reflecting a corner solution as we constrain the variance components to be non-negative. This raises concerns about model misspecification. As a robustness check, we re-estimate the model in Eq. (2), without non-negativity constraints on the individual variance components. Table 6 Panel B shows that the negative *C* components are very small in magnitude (-3.9% to -9.8%) and never statistically significant, reducing concerns about misspecification bias.

A related concern is that some of the measures of investment behaviors are censored (e.g., *Home bias* is between zero and one). We have verified that a Tobit model specification results in unchanged, and sometimes stronger, *A* components (not tabulated).

# 5.3.3. Model assumptions

*Equal Environments Assumption* (EEA): If parents or others in an individual's environment treat identical twins more similarly than fraternal twins (along dimensions that are relevant for the investment behaviors we study), then *A* may be upward biased. This is a well-recognized problem in twin research, and substantial resources have been devoted to tests of the EEA.<sup>15</sup> From research on IQ and personality, where the EEA has to date been tested most rigorously, the evidence suggests that any bias from violations of the EEA is not of first-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> For the *Disposition effect*, we also include *Turnover* and the *Number of holdings* as controls (Dhar and Zhu, 2006).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> We also examine the correlation between monozygotic twins by gender. If men are more influential with respect to investment decisions in a household, we expect that the correlations are higher between monozygotic male twins than between monozygotic female twins. In untabulated results, we do not find any systematic patterns. For three of the biases, the correlations among male identical twins are somewhat higher; for another three biases, the correlations are somewhat higher among female identical twins.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> See, e.g., Goldberger (1979) for a discussion of common concerns related to twin studies.

Table 5

Stocks and mutual funds.

This table reports results from maximum likelihood estimation. The difference investment behaviors are modeled as linear functions of observable socioeconomic variables (see Table 4 for a list of the variables included) and unobservable random effects representing additive genetic effects (A), share environmental effects (C), as well as an individual-specific error (E). For each estimated model, we report the variance fraction of the combined error term explained by each unobserved effect (A Share – for the additive genetic effect, C Share – for common environmental effect, as well as the corresponding bootstrapped standard errors (1,000 resamples). Investment behaviors are derived from all holdings of stocks as well as equity mutual funds. All variables are defined in Appendix Table A1. N provides the number of observations used in each estimation.

		Variance components				
Model	Ν	A-Share	C-Share	E-Share		
Diversification	30,416	0.379	0.020	0.601		
		0.032	0.021	0.015		
Home bias	30,416	0.345	0.000	0.655		
		0.012	0.002	0.012		
Turnover	28,108	0.251	0.000	0.749		
		0.022	0.008	0.018		
Disposition effect	3,086	0.160	0.000	0.840		
		0.053	0.021	0.045		
Performance chasing	25,530	0.267	0.000	0.733		
		0.019	0.003	0.019		
Skewness preference	30,416	0.266	0.000	0.734		
Ĩ		0.036	0.017	0.024		

order importance (e.g., Bouchard, 1998). Specifically, researchers have studied twins reared apart, i.e., twins separated at birth or early in life, for which there is no common parental environment. Such studies often produce heritability estimates similar to those using twins who were reared together (e.g., Bouchard, Lykken, McGue, Segal, and Tellegen, 1990). Perhaps even more convincingly, recent progress in genotyping has enabled researchers to construct DNA-based measures of pairwise genetic relatedness, which were then related to different outcomes, e.g., IQ (Jian, Benyamin, McEvoy, Gordon, Henders, Nyholt, Madden, Heath, Martin, Montgomery, Goddard, and Visscher, 2010; Davies, Tenesa, Payton, Yang, Harris, Liewald, Ke, Le Hellard, Christoforou, Luciano, McGhee, Lopez, Gow, Corley, Redmond, Fox, Haggarty, Whalley, McNeill, and Goddard, 2011). Differently from twin studies, these studies use unrelated subjects and show without relying on any assumptions such as the EEA that at least 50% of the variation in the studied outcomes is due to genetic variation. At the same time, twin researchers continue to test the EEA. One concern has been that the matched physical appearance of identical twins results in more similar treatment by those who are a part of these individuals' environments, in the end causing more similar outcomes. Using a novel research design, Segal (2013) studies unrelated look-alike individuals, and finds that their correlations for personality measures are much lower than for identical twins, suggesting that identical twins' similarity with respect to personality mostly reflects similarity in their genes, and not similar treatments by others. Finally, a concern relevant for this paper is that inheritances that twins receive from their parents might be more similar (for example, with respect to the asset composition) for identical than fraternal twins. Since by law, children in Sweden inherit any assets only after the death of the last parent, we perform a robustness check by excluding twins for whom both parents are deceased from the samples used in Table 5. Re-estimating all six models, we find estimates (not tabulated) that are very similar to those reported in Table 5. We conclude that inheritances do not seem to confound our results.

Intra-twin pair communication: If identical twins communicate more with one another than fraternal twins, and if such interaction impacts their investments (e.g., Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1998; Hong, Kubik, and Stein, 2004), then A may reflect the direct as well as indirect (via increased communication) effects of genetic similarity. We address this concern using two robustness checks. First, we exclude twin pairs with more than 50% similarity in their portfolios.<sup>16</sup> Panel C of Table 6 reveals evidence of a substantial genetic effect even when excluding twins with similar portfolios. Second, we control directly for intra-twin pair communication. To do so, we sort twin pairs into deciles based on intratwin pair contact frequency (available for a subset of twins from STR) and randomly exclude twins until we have equally many identical and fraternal pairs in each decile. We repeat this process 100 times and then perform one estimation for each of the 100 samples. Table 6 Panel D reports that the median A components are still large and statistically significant.<sup>17</sup> Only for the *Disposition effect* do we no longer find a significant genetic effect once we control for communication, but the sample size for this specific robustness check is very small contributing to the large confidence interval.

# 5.3.4. Relatively large portfolios

Investors with relatively small portfolios may not be incentivized to overcome innate predispositions to certain biases. As a robustness check, we therefore exclude all individuals for whom the equity portfolio does not constitute at least 20% of their total assets, including real estate assets. The results in Panel E of Table 6 suggest that genetic factors continue to be important even among investors with substantial equity exposure.

### 6. Additional results

# 6.1. Behavioral consistency: investment biases and behaviors in other domains

We examine whether some of the previously analyzed investment biases are in fact facets of broader behaviors. Specifically, we identify behaviors in domains other than investments, and then we estimate the genetic correlation between investment biases and those behaviors in other domains. An example is the preference for familiarity. As described in Section 2, recent papers study the genetic basis of familiarity (e.g., Chew, Ebstein, and Zhong, 2011). We therefore examine if a preference for the familiar in the investment domain is correlated with a preference for familiarity in some other domains, and most importantly, whether genetic factors influencing the *Home bias* also affect familiarity

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Specifically, we drop twin pairs for whom the sum of the absolute value of portfolio weight differences is less than one (on a range between zero for identical portfolios and two for non-overlapping portfolios).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Below each median variance share, we report the corresponding 5th and 95th percentile values.

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#### H. Cronqvist, S. Siegel / Journal of Financial Economics 113 (2014) 215-234

#### Table 6

Robustness checks.

This table reports results from maximum likelihood estimation for investment behaviors measured on direct stock holdings only. The different investment behaviors are modeled as linear functions of observable socioeconomic variables (see Table 4 for a list of the variables include) and unobservable random effects representing additive genetic effects (A), share environmental effects (C), as well as an individual-specific error (E). For each estimated model, we report the variance fraction of the combined error term explained by each unobserved effect (A Share – for the additive genetic effect, C Share – for common environmental effect, E Share – for the individual-specific environmental effect) as well as (except for Panel D) the corresponding bootstrapped standard errors (1,000 resamples). Panel A presents results for the subset of twin pairs that exclude opposite-sex twin pairs. Panel B allows the variance components to take on negative values for cases where the shared environmental component (C) is estimated to be zero in Table 4. Panel C reports results for the subset of twin pairs for whom the sum of the absolute value of portfolio weight differences is at least one (on a range between zero (identical portfolios) and two (non-overlapping portfolios)). In Panel D, twin pairs are sorted into ten bins based on contact frequency between them (contact frequency ranges from zero to 360 contacts per day). By randomly dropping identical and fraternal twins, we ensure that each bin has the same number of identical and fraternal twin pairs. We repeat the random selection 100 times and report the median as well as the 5th and 95th percentiles of the estimated variance factions. Panel E reports results for the subsample of investors who invest at least 20% of their total assets in risky financial assets. All variables are defined in Appendix Table A1. N provides the number of observations used in each estimation.

Panel A: Same-sex twins only								
		Variance components						
Model	Ν	A-Share	C-Share	<i>E</i> -Share				
Diversification	7,916	0.379	0.083	0.538				
		0.111	0.084	0.044				
Home bias	7,916	0.459	0.013	0.528				
		0.086	0.063	0.041				
Turnover	7,412	0.270	0.000	0.730				
		0.053	0.033	0.032				
Disposition effect	564	0.245	0.000	0.755				
-		0.135	0.043	0.120				
Performance chasing	4,390	0.331	0.085	0.584				
C C		0.102	0.079	0.040				
Skewness preference	7,916	0.282	0.000	0.718				
•		0.057	0.037	0.036				
Panel B: Model misspecification								

		Variance components					
Model	Ν	A-Share	C-Share	<i>E</i> -Share			
Home bias	12,378	0.505	-0.044	0.539			
		0.102	0.072	0.042			
Turnover	11,508	0.356	-0.082	0.726			
		0.077	0.051	0.033			
Disposition effect	782	0.411	-0.098	0.688			
		0.292	0.180	0.136			
Skewness preference	12,378	0.325	-0.039	0.714			
		0.101	0.070	0.041			
Panel C: Excluding similar portfolio	DS						

			Variance components	
Model	Ν	A-Share	C-Share	E-Share
Diversification	9,902	0.327	0.015	0.658
		0.078	0.049	0.042
Home bias	9,902	0.236	0.000	0.764
		0.061	0.028	0.043
Turnover	8,990	0.208	0.000	0.792
		0.044	0.021	0.033
Disposition effect	582	0.155	0.000	0.845
		0.116	0.048	0.103
Performance chasing	5,208	0.201	0.060	0.739
		0.087	0.060	0.040
Skewness preference	9,902	0.111	0.054	0.835
		0.067	0.051	0.031

		0	1100				
Danal De	Controlling	tor	dittoroncoc	117	intra tunn	nair	communication
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		Variance components		
Model	Ν	A-Share	C-Share	<i>E</i> -Share
Diversification	6,228	0.251	0.176	0.578
		0.130-0.369	0.073-0.282	0.544-0.598
Home bias	6,228	0.216	0.209	0.574
_		0.130-0.360	0.090-0.292	0.547-0.604
Turnover	5,836	0.241	0.020	0.744
	440	0.136-0.272 0.000-0.108		0.725-0.764
Disposition effect	412	0.177	0.000	0.805
De ferrer de la cierce	2544	0.000-0.297	0.000-0.080	0.702-0.953
Performance chasing	3,544	0.224	0.164	0.612
Cl.	6.220	0.131-0.315	0.089-0.251	0.586-0.638
Skewness preference	6,228	0.209	0.071	0.723
Danal F. Investors with at least 20	% of total assots invested in	0.080-0.290	0.000-0.179	0.694-0.757
Funer E. Investors with at least 20.	% of total assets invested in	nsky jinunciui ussets		
		Variance components		
Model	Ν	A-Share	C-Share	E-Share
Diversification	2,574	0.656	0.000	0.344
		0.089	0.052	0.053
Home bias	2,574	0.499	0.134	0.367
		0.174	0.127	0.073
Turnover	2,306	0.438	0.000	0.562
		0.143	0.078	0.089
Disposition effect	344	0.227	0.000	0.773
		0.214	0.076	0.192
Performance chasing	1,814	0.297	0.224	0.479
		0.171	0.133	0.068
Skewness preference	2,574	0.350	0.040	0.609
		0.163	0.126	0.082

preferences in other domains. We consider two measures of familiarity preferences in domains other than investments: the distance between an individual's home location and her birth place, *Distance to birthplace*, and an indicator for whether an individual's spouse is born in the same region as the individual herself, *Spouse from home region*.

In Table 7, we report results from decomposing the covariance of these investment and other behaviors into components corresponding to genetic effects and effects of common and individual-specific environments. Specifically, we use a bivariate Cholesky decomposition (Neale and Maes, 2004). This model controls for individual socioeconomic characteristics such as income and wealth that may determine both investment behavior and non-investment choices.

We report several results. First, variation in familiarity in other, non-investment domains reflects significant genetic differences: 40% for home location and 15% for choice of spouse. Second, *Home bias* and *Distance to birthplace* are significantly negatively correlated, suggesting that those with relatively more local stocks also have a stronger preference for a home location close to their birth place. Finally, and most importantly, the significantly negative genetic correlation between both behaviors suggests that the genetic factors affecting *Home bias* also affect *Distance to birthplace*. While we do not find an overall correlation between *Home bias* and *Spouse from home region*, we find a large, though statistically not significant, positive genetic correlation between both behaviors.

This evidence is important because it suggests that behavioral consistency across several domains might be due to genetic endowments. That is, individuals are born with certain predispositions that affect their behaviors in many domains, including investments. The finding is also consistent with the view that preferences or behavior reflect psychological mechanisms that have been shaped by evolutionary forces whose effects extend to choices, such as financial investment decisions, that did not exist in ancient times.

# 6.2. Moderators of genetic effects on investment biases

The relative importance of genetic relative to non-genetic factors can vary across different investors or environments. Cunha and Heckman (2010) go as far as concluding that "the nature versus nurture distinction is obsolete," and they argue that the notion that genes are moderated by environments should receive more attention in economic research. For an extensive review of research on so called "gene–environment interactions," we refer to Rutter (2006).

# 6.2.1. Work experience in finance

Does work experience in, for example, a bank or a corporate treasury department reduce the impact of genetic predispositions with respect to investment biases? We use data on an individual's occupation, based on the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88) by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and available for a subset of our sample, to identify twins with work experience related to finance. We re-estimate the above models including only twin pairs with relevant finance experience. To increase the sample size, we consider direct as well as indirect holdings of equity. We include the same socioeconomic controls as previously.

#### H. Cronqvist, S. Siegel / Journal of Financial Economics 113 (2014) 215-234

### Table 7

Behavioral consistency: investment biases and behaviors in other domains.

This table reports results from maximum likelihood estimation of two bivariate models. *Home bias* (measured for direct holdings of stocks) and *Distance to birthplace* (Model I) or *Spouse from home region* (Model II) are modeled jointly as a linear function of observable socioeconomic characteristics (*Home bias* only – see Table 4 for a list of socioeconomic variables included) as well as three unobservable random effects representing additive genetic effects (*A*), shared environmental effects (*C*), as well as an individual specific error (*E*). For each model, we report the variance fraction explained by each random effect (*A* Share – for the additive genetic effects, *C* Share – for shared environmental effects, *E* Share – for the individual-specific random effect), the overall correlation between both variables in a given model as well as the correlation between the genetic and individual specific environmental effects on each variable. Corresponding standard errors are bootstrapped with 1,000 resamples. Whenever one of the random effects (*A*, *C*, or *E*) is estimated to be zero, the corresponding correlation is set to zero. All variables are defined in Appendix Table A1. *N* provides the number of observations used in each estimation.

	Model I		Model II	
	Home bias	Distance to birthplace	Home bias	Spouse from home region
A-Share	0.453	0.400	0.356	0.148
	0.059	0.081	0.111	0.089
C-Share	0.000	0.211	0.000	0.191
	0.038	0.056	0.071	0.066
<i>E</i> -Share	0.547	0.389	0.644	0.661
	0.036	0.036	0.073	0.040
Correlation	-0.027		0.003	
	0.009		0.021	
Genetic correlation	-0.101		0.221	
	0.034		0.247	
Correlation of common environment	0.000		0.000	
Correlation of individual environment	0.035		-0.073	
	0.021		0.035	
Ν	12,180			2,566

Table 8 reports the corresponding results.<sup>18</sup> For twins with finance work experience, the relative importance of genetic factors is substantially smaller for each of the investment behaviors than for the overall population. Only for *Skewness preference* does the *A* component remain marginally significant at 15%. For *Diversification, Home bias*, and *Performance chasing*, genetic differences seem to account for almost none of the variation. For *Turnover*, the *A* share decreases to 10% and is no longer statistically significant. At the same time, the similar work environment experienced by this specific subset of twins seems to generate pair-specific commonality in their behavior.

While we cannot rule out that the selection into specific occupations reduces the relevant genetic variation in this particular subsample, the evidence in Table 8 is consistent with finance work experience reducing the impact of genetic predispositions with respect to investment biases.

#### 6.2.2. Education

Education is another potentially important moderator of genetic effects. For example, Johnson, Kyvik, Mortensen, Skytthe, Batty, and Deary (2010) report, in a different context, that general education reduces expressions of genetic predispositions to poor health. Individuals may be born with a propensity to poor health, but education enables them to reduce such genetic propensities. In our paper, it is therefore interesting to examine the extent to which education moderates the importance of genetic factors for investment biases.

In terms of empirical methodology, we rely on the geneenvironment interaction model by Purcell (2002). Fig. 2

### Table 8

Work-related experience with finance.

This table reports results from maximum likelihood estimation for subsets of twins that have occupational experience in finance. The difference investment behaviors are modeled as linear functions of observable socioeconomic variables (see Table 4 for a list of the variables include) and unobservable random effects representing additive genetic effects (*A*), shared environmental effects (*C*), as well as an individual-specific error (*E*). For each estimated model, we report the variance fraction of the combined error term explained by each unobserved effect (*A* Share – for the additive genetic effect, *C* Share – for common environmental effect, *E* Share – for the individual-specific environmental effect, as well as the corresponding bootstrapped standard errors (1,000 resamples). Investment behaviors are derived from all holdings of stocks and equity mutual funds. All variables are defined in Appendix Table A1. *N* provides the number of observations used in each estimation.

		Variance components		
Model	Ν	A-Share	C-Share	E-Share
Diversification	622	0.017	0.188	0.795
		0.114	0.090	0.074
Home bias	622	0.000	0.197	0.803
		0.080	0.078	0.071
Turnover	582	0.108	0.022	0.871
		0.096	0.060	0.083
Performance chasing	562	0.000	0.086	0.914
		0.092	0.053	0.084
Skewness preference	622	0.152	0.000	0.848
		0.083	0.018	0.081

provides a graphical description of the model. In contrast with the model outlined in Eq. (2), a moderator (M), here education, interacts with the unobservable genetic and environmental factors of the investment behavior (y). The model allows education and the investment behavior to be correlated via exposure of the investment behavior to the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> We have too few twin pairs with occupation data to estimate a separate model for *Disposition effect*.

H. Cronqvist, S. Siegel / Journal of Financial Economics 113 (2014) 215-234



**Fig. 2.** Gene–environment interaction. This figure presents a graphical presentation of the gene–environment interaction model proposed by **Purcell** (2002). *M* symbolizes the moderator and *y* the Investment bias index. *A*, *C*, and *E* correspond to the unobservable genetic and environmental factors. See **Purcell** (2002) for details.

unobservable genetic and environmental factors of the moderator. That is, we include all twins with non-missing education data and account for the possibility that educational outcomes and investment behaviors are not independent. Finally, we use regressions to remove the effect of the socioeconomic characteristics used as control variables in Table 4, with the exception of educational characteristics (not tabulated).

We measure educational outcome with *Years of education* which is based on the highest completed degree.<sup>19</sup> To reduce the dimensionality of the analysis, we employ the previously introduced *Investment bias index* that summarizes the six investment behaviors for each individual.

Fig. 3 reports a graphical summary of the results, displaying the absolute size of the genetic and environmental variances (vertical axis) as a function of *Years of education* (horizontal axis). We find that education does not reduce the effect of genetic predisposition to investment biases. In particular, the detailed results of the model estimation in Appendix Table A2 suggest a small increase in genetic variance due to education.<sup>20</sup> Further, Fig. 3 shows that the variance of common environmental effects also increases slightly, but in a statistically insignificant way, as individuals obtain more education, while the individual-specific environmental variation remains unchanged. These results suggest that differences in genetic propensity to investment biases are not reduced by an increase in general education.

### 6.3. Evidence from discordant twin pair research design

While our results demonstrate the important role genetic factors play in determining investment behaviors, they also show that substantial variation observed among the individuals in our sample is due to individual-specific environmental effects, captured by the *E* component in our variance



**Fig. 3.** Education as a moderator. This figure presents results of the geneenvironment interaction model proposed by Purcell (2002). Years of education acts as the environmental moderator. The *x*-axis represents years of education, while the *y*-axis represents the residual variance of the Investment bias index, due to genetic effects (A – dark grey), the common environment (C– black), and the individual-specific environment (E – light grey). See Appendix Table A2 for detailed estimation results.

decomposition models. Identifying the specific circumstances, experiences, or events as well as the mechanisms through which they impact investment choices is important for better models of investor behavior as well as public policy. One challenge researchers face is that individuals self-select into experiences and life events partly as a function of their genetic predispositions. Consequently, controlling for genetic factors is important in the search of environmental factors that matter for investment behaviors. Using the socioeconomic variables included in our model, we show how genetically informed data, such as twin data, can be used to address such confounding effects.

Using data on identical twins allows us to apply a "discordant twin pair research design" that approximates a natural experiment. The approach allows to compare the investment behaviors of twin pairs who are discordant on, e.g., education, but match on genes and shared environment. The design provides a useful analogue to a counterfactual design, and the absence of an association within discordant twin pairs means that a previously observed association between an individual characteristic and investment behavior is attributable to shared genetic or environmental factors.<sup>21</sup>

Assume an investment bias  $y_{ij}$ , observed for a pair *i* of identical twins (j = 1,2), is a linear function of observable socioeconomic characteristics and unobservable genetic and environmental effects,  $a_i$ ,  $c_i$ , and  $e_{ij}$ , such that

$$y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta \mathbf{X}_{ij} + a_i + c_i + e_{ij}. \tag{3}$$

We can then eliminate the genetic and shared environmental effects,  $a_i$  and  $c_i$ , by considering the difference between the twins in a pair:

$$y_{i1} - y_{i2} = \beta(\mathbf{X}_{i1} - \mathbf{X}_{i2}) + e_{i1} - e_{i2}.$$
 (4)

To implement this research design, we select all identical twins from our sample of twins with direct stock holdings. While identical twins are similar in many aspects, we observe that in our sample about 20% of them are discordant with respect to their education. We use a standard linear regression model to regress the *Investment bias index* on a set of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> For some individuals, we have information on their highest degree, but not on *Years of education*. We use a linear regression model to estimate *Years of education* for those individuals. See Appendix Table A1 for details.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> This conclusion is based on a significantly positive estimate of  $alpha_u$  which has the same sign as the estimate of  $a_u$ . For estimation purposes, *Years of education* is expressed in units of ten years.

 $<sup>^{21}</sup>$  See Taubman (1976) for an early application of this empirical methodology.

# Table 9

#### Discordant identical twins: investment bias index.

This table reports results from linear regressions of the Bias index (column Level) and the intra-twin-pair difference in the Bias index (Column Twin difference) onto socioeconomic variables. For each estimated model, we report the coefficient estimates as well as the corresponding standard errors. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity as well as correlation between twins in a twin-pair. Only direct stock holdings are considered in the construction of the Bias index. All variables are defined in Appendix Table A1.  $R^2$  is the fraction of total variation explained by the socioeconomic variables. N provides the number of observations used in each estimation.

Variable	Level	Twin differences
Intercept	2.969	-0.002
	0.594	0.034
Male	0.280	
	0.051	
Age	0.166	
	0.105	
Age-squared	0.000	
	0.000	
High school	0.046	0.218
	0.075	0.116
College or more	-0.225	0.101
	0.071	0.126
No education data available	0.046	0.517
	0.146	0.244
Married	-0.085	-0.026
	0.052	0.066
Above median wealth indicator	-0.557	-0.391
	0.053	0.072
Log of disposable income	0.090	-0.083
	0.050	0.077
$R^2$	0.080	0.020
Ν	3,952	1,976

socioeconomic characteristics, including education. The first column in Table 9 reports the results. One of the important results is that a college degree is significantly inversely related to investment biases. In the second column of Table 9, we report corresponding regression results when using differences between twins as opposed to levels for each twin. Comparing the estimates in the first and second columns, we conclude that the effects of a college degree are reduced once we eliminate genetic and shared environmental effects. That is, the effects of a college degree on investment biases reported in the first column are confounded, and attributable to unobservable genetic or shared environmental factors. More generally, the evidence presented here suggests that genetically informed data can play an important role when evaluating the causal effect of circumstances, experiences, or events with respect to investment behavior.

# 7. Conclusion

For a long list of investment "biases," including lack of diversification, excessive trading, and the disposition effect, we find that genetic differences explain up to 45% of the remaining variation across individual investors, after controlling for observable individual characteristics. Our results provide the first direct evidence from real-world, nonexperimental data that persistent investment behaviors are to a significant extent determined by genetic endowments.

The importance of genetic relative to environmental factors is found to vary across different investors. Most

importantly, among investors with finance-related work experience, we find a significant reduction of the relative amount of genetic variation, which is consistent with practical experience in finance moderating genetic predispositions. Interestingly, general education does not seem to have a similar moderating effect.

These results have implications for the design of public policy in the domain of financial literacy (e.g., <u>Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007; Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie, 2011</u>). Specifically, the evidence suggests that policy should be designed accounting for the existence of genetic predispositions to investment biases and considering the challenges in reducing such biases. Some contemporaneous research has reached similar conclusions. For example, Bhattacharya, Hackethal, Kaesler, Loos, and Meyer (2012) show in a large field study that investors who are offered unbiased investment advice often are not interested in the advice and even those who are interested generally do not follow the advice.

So what explains the genetic effects we find? As argued in Table 1 of our paper, recent research in behavioral genetics has related specific genes to several of the psychological mechanisms that may manifest themselves as investment biases. That is, some individuals are endowed with genes related to familiarity (e.g., Chew, Ebstein, and Zhong, 2011), overconfidence (e.g., Cesarini, Johannesson, Lichtenstein, and Wallace, 2009b), or sensation-seeking (e.g., Derringer, Krueger, Dick, Saccone, Grucza, Agrawal, Lin, Almasy, Edenberg, Foroud, Nurnberger, Hesselbrock, Kramer, Kuperman, Porjesz, Schuckit, and Bierut, 2010), and these genes may manifest themselves in the individual's investment behavior, as well as in the individual's behavior in other, non-investment domains. An additional explanation for some of our results, which is consistent with recent work in finance (e.g., Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Linnainmaa, 2011, 2012), is that variation in IQ is genetic, which results in genetic variation in investment biases.

## 8. Future research

We see several directions for future research related to the genetics of investment biases. First, while recent studies in molecular genetics, using DNA-level data, have confirmed the importance of genetic differences (for height and IQ) first documented using twin studies (Jian, Benyamin, McEvoy, Gordon, Henders, Nyholt, Madden, Heath, Martin, Montgomery, Goddard, and Visscher, 2010; Davies, Tenesa, Payton, Yang, Harris, Liewald, Ke, Le Hellard, Christoforou, Luciano, McGhee, Lopez, Gow, Corley, Redmond, Fox, Haggarty, Whalley, McNeill, and Goddard, 2011), the relative variation that can be explained by individual candidate genes has so far remained low, rarely exceeding 10%. With the increasing availability of large genetic data sets, we expect that genome-wide association studies (GWAS) that consider a very large number of genes can be applied to complex, economic behaviors, including investment biases. Such studies might reveal that a large number of genes is required to successfully predict differences between individual investors.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> For early evidence from genome-wide association studies in economics, see, for example, Beauchamp, Cesarini, Johannesson, van der Loos, Koellinger, Groenen, Fowler, Rosenquist, Thurik, and Christakis

Second, we have examined the genetic correlations among the investment biases (not tabulated). The magnitudes of these correlations are generally rather low. Perhaps the most interesting result from this exercise, given that we are not aware of any candidate genes mapped to representativeness so far (see Table 1), is a positive genetic correlation of 0.23 between *Performance chasing* and *Skewness preference*. This suggests that the same set of genes that contribute to performance chasing may also help to explain the preference for skewness, but further interdisciplinary research is required to fully understand these relationships.

Finally, while we focus on genetics in this paper, it is important to emphasize that the environment also affects investment biases, either directly or as a moderator of genetic predispositions. Indeed, more than 50% of the variation in

# **Table A1**Definition of all variables.

investment biases across investors is attributable to individual-specific experiences and events. Interestingly, our results show that first-order individual characteristics leave most of the variation in investment biases unexplained. This suggests that the environmental factors and mechanisms representing these individual-specific experiences and events could also be complex, possibly consisting of many particular experiences, and their interactions. Future research should further examine which specific experiences (e.g., early in an individual's life or career) are most important when it comes to determining investment behaviors.

# Appendix A

See Tables A1 and A2.

Variable	Description
Types of twins Identical twins	Twins that are genetically identical, also called monozygotic twins. Zygosity is determined by the Swedish Twin Registry based on questions about intrapair similarities in childhood
Non-identical Twins	Twins that share on average 50% of their genes, also called dizygotic or fraternal twins. Non-identical twins can be of the same sex or of opposite sex. Zygosity is determined by the Swedish Twin Registry based on questions about intrapair similarities in childhood
Investment biases & trading behavior	
Diversification	For direct stock holdings, Diversification is defined as the number of distinct stocks held in an individual's portfolio at the end of a year. For holdings of stocks and mutual funds, Diversification is defined as the proportion invested in mutual funds, but not invested in individual stocks. To reduce measurement error, we calculate the equally weighted average Diversification across all years the individual is in the data set
Home bias	Home bias is defined as the equity portfolio share of Swedish securities.In particular, at the end of each year and for each investor, we add the market value of all Swedish stocks in the investor's portfolio to the market value of the Swedish equity allocation of all mutual funds held by the investor. We divide the value of these Swedish equity holdings by the total market value of direct (i.e., stocks) and indirect (i.e., equity allocation of mutual funds) equity holdings. We classify stocks as Swedish or foreign based on the country in which the stock is legally registered, as reflected in the country code of a given stock's ISIN. For mutual funds, we collect annual fund-specific data from Morningstar on the fund's total equity allocation as well as on the fund's equity allocation to Sweden. For equity or mixed mutual funds that are not covered by Morningstar, we infer the fund's investment focus from the fund's name. By default, we assume that the fund is fully invested in international equities. Only if the fund name suggests an investment focus on Swedish equity, we classify the fund as Swedish. Finally, to improve the precision of our measure, for each investor we calculate the equally weighted average Home bias across all years with non-missing data
Turnover	For direct stock holdings, we divide, for each individual investor and year, the sales volume (in Swedish krona) during the year by the value of directly held stocks at the beginning of the year. Since we do not have sales price information for mutual funds, we also construct a turnover measure using the number of sales during the year divided by the number of equity securities in the investor's portfolio at the beginning of the year. In each case, Turnover is defined as the average annual turnover using all years with equity holdings data for an investor. To avoid that our analysis is affected by outliers, we drop observations for which Turnover is higher than the top one percentile of the Turnover distribution
Disposition effect	We measure the Disposition effect as the difference between the ratio of the number of realized torealized and unrealized gains and the ratio of the number of realized to realized and unrealized losses (Odean, 1998; Dhar and Zhu, 2006). We do not observe purchases of securities and even though we have data on sales transactions, we do not observe the date of the transaction. We therefore use changes in the annual holdings data to identify net purchases and sales of equity securities for each investor. We start by dropping all securities that are present in an investor's portfolio in 1998, the beginning of our sample period, as we cannot observe when the security entered the investor's portfolio. Next, when we observe a given security for the first time in an investor's portfolio at the end of the year, we assign the average (tax) value (averaged between the (tax) value of the previous and the current year) as the relevant purchased and reference price. We increase (decrease) this reference price when additional units of this security are purchased at a higher (lower) value in later years. At the end of each year with at least one sales transaction in the relevant group of securities (stocks or stocks and equity mutual funds), we compare the reference price of each security in an investor's portfolio (including those securities whose holdings decrease to zero over that year) to the current value of the security (where the current value is the average of the (tax) value of the previous and the current year). If the current value is higher (lower) than the reference price, we consider the position a gain (loss). We further categorize gains and losses as realized if the number of units held decreases

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# H. Cronqvist, S. Siegel / Journal of Financial Economics 113 (2014) 215-234

# Table A1 (continued)

Variable	Description
	relative to the previous year, and unrealized otherwise. Finally, for each investor, we count the total number of realized and unrealized gains and losses. The Disposition effect is then the difference between the ratio of realized to realized and unrealized gains and the ratio of realized to realized and unrealized losses. It is set to missing unless both ratios exist
Performance chasing	Performance chasing is measured by an individual's propensity to purchase securities that have performed well in the recent past. Specifically, each year we sort stocks and equity mutual funds separately into return deciles using the raw returns during the year. For each investor and year, we calculate the fraction of purchased securities (identified by positive net-changes of annual holdings) with returns in the top two deciles. Performance chasing is the average of this fraction over all years in which an investor has made net-purchases of securities
Skewness preference	Skewness preference is measured in the spirit of Kumar (2009). For each investor and year we calculate the fraction of the portfolio that is invested in "lottery" securities. We define a security as a lottery security if it has a below median price as well as above median idiosyncratic volatility and skewness. We use the world market return, the squared world market return, the local Swedish market return, and the squared local market returns factor in our asset pricing model to determine a security's idiosyncratic error term. Regressions are performed every year using the last 24 months of return data. Skewness preference is the fraction of lottery securities held in an investor's equity portfolio, averaged over all years with portfolio data
Investment bias index	The Investment bias index summarizes the magnitude of the six investment behaviors for direct stock holdings. It takes on values between zero and 12. For each behavior, we assign a value of zero (no bias), one, or two (most biased), depending on the observed level. The index is the sum across all six investment behaviors. If for a given investor, a behavior is missing, we use the median behavior to assign the bias index component (zero, one, or two). In particular, for Diversification, we assign two to investors with only one stock, one to investors with two to six stocks, and zero to investors with more than six stocks. For Home bias, we assign two to investors with a 100% allocation to Swedish stocks, one to investors with less than 100%, but more than 20% allocation to Swedish stocks, and zero for investors with a value between 20% and 55%, and zero otherwise. For Disposition effect, we assign two to investors with a value between 20% and 55%, one to investors with a value between 20% and 55%, one to investors with a value between 20% and 55%, one to investors with a value between 20% and 55%, one to investors with a value between 20% and 55%, one to investors with a value between 20% and 55%, one to investors with a value between 20% and 55%, one to investors with a value between 20% and 55%, one to investors with a value between 20% and 55%, one to investors with a value between 20% and 55%, one to investors with a value between 20% and 55%, one to investors with a value between 20% and 55%, one to investors with a value between 20% and 55%, one to investors with a value between 20% and 55%, and zero otherwise. For Disposition effect, we assign two to investors with a lisposition effect over 40%, one to investors with a value above 40%, one to investors with a value between 20% and 55%, and zero otherwise. For Skewness preference, we assign two to investors with a value above 15%, one to investors with a value between 5% and 15%, and zero otherwise
Socioeconomic characteristics	
Male	An indicator variable that equals one if an individual is male and zero otherwise. Gender is obtained from Statistics Sweden
Age Less than high school	The average age over the years an individual is included in our sample. Age is obtained from Statistics Sweden An indicator variable that equals one if an individual has not completed high school (gymnasium), zero otherwise. Educational information is obtained from Statistics Sweden
High school	An indicator variable that equals one if an individual has completed high school (gymnasium) but has not attended university, zero otherwise. Educational information is obtained from Statistics Sweden
College or more	An indicator variable that equals one if an individual has attended university, zero otherwise. Educational information is obtained from Statistics Sweden
No education data available	An indicator variable that equals one if no educational data are available for an individual, zero otherwise. Educational information is obtained from Statistics Sweden
Years of education	Years of education is based on the highest completed degree. For a subset of the sample, the variable is obtained from the Swedish Twin Registry. We use a linear regression model to extend the variable to the rest of our sample. Specifically, we regress the years of education onto indicator variables High school and College or more (available for most individuals in our data set from Statistics Sweden) and then predict years of education out of sample
Married	The average (over the years an individual is included in our sample) of an annual indicator variable that equals one if an individual is married in a given year and zero otherwise. The marital status is obtained from Statistics Sweden
Disposable income	The average individual disposable income (over the years an individual is included in our sample), as defined by Statistics Sweden, that is, the sum of income from labor, business, and investment, plus received transfers, less taxes and alimony payments. Expressed in nominal Swedish Krona (SEK) (unless indicated otherwise). The data are obtained from Statistics Sweden
Financial assets	The average end-of-year market value of an individual's financial assets (over the years an individual is included in our sample) as reported by Statistics Sweden, expressed in nominal Swedish Krona (SEK) (unless indicated otherwise). Financial assets include checking, savings, and money market accounts, (direct and indirect) bond holdings, (direct and indirect) equity holdings, investments in options and other financial assets such as rights, convertibles, and warrants
Total assets	The average end-of-year market value of an individual's financial and real assets (over the years an individual is included in our sample) as reported by Statistics Sweden, expressed in nominal Swedish Krona (SEK) (unless indicated otherwise)
Net worth	The average difference between the end-of-year market value of an individual's assets and her liabilities (over the years an individual is included in our sample), as reported by Statistics Sweden. Expressed in nominal Swedish Krona (SEK) (unless indicated otherwise). We form indicator variables that indicate whether an individual's net worth is in the first, second, third, or fourth quartile of the net-worth distribution
Number of stocks and equity mutual funds	The average end-of-year number of holdings of distinct individual stocks and equity mutual funds (over the years an individual is included in our sample), as reported by Statistics Sweden
Value of stocks and equity mutual funds	The average end-of-year market value of holdings of individual stocks and equity mutual funds (over the years an individual is included in our sample), as reported by Statistics Sweden. Expressed in nominal Swedish Krona (SEK) (unless indicated otherwise)

# Table A1 (continued)

Variable	Description
Number of stocks	The average end-of-year number of holdings of distinct individual stocks (over the years an individual is included in our sample) as reported by Statistics Sweden
Value of stocks	The average end-of-year market value of holdings of individual stocks (over the years an individual is included in our sample), as reported by Statistics Sweden. Expressed in nominal Swedish Krona (SEK) (unless indicated otherwise)
Number of equity mutual funds	The average end-of-year number of holdings of distinct equity mutual funds (over the years an individual is included in our sample), as reported by Statistics Sweden
Value of equity mutual funds	The average end-of-year market value of holdings of equity mutual funds (over the years an individual is included in our sample), as reported by Statistics Sweden, Expressed in nominal Swedish Krona (SEK) (unless indicated otherwise)
Contact intensity	The number of contacts per year between twins. The number is calculated as the average of the numbers reported by both twins. If only one twin provides a number, this number is used. The data are obtained from the Swedish Twin Registry
Distance to birthplace	The driving distance in kilometers to the state of birth. We define this distance to be the average distance to the center of all municipalities within the state of birth weighted by their population. The distance is obtained from Caracle Maga. The according purplement are obtained from Statistics Surgers.
Spouse from home region	An indicator variable available for married individuals that takes on the value of one if the spouse was born in the same state as the individual and zero otherwise

# Table A2

#### Education as a moderator.

This appendix table reports parameter estimates and standard errors (s.e.) from maximum likelihood estimation of gene-environmental interactions models (see Fig. 2 for a presentation of the model). The moderator variable is education as measured by years of education (divided by ten for computational reasons). The Bias index is based on financial behaviors related to direct stock holdings only. In a first stage (untabulated), we have removed (via linear regression) the effect of control variables listed in Table 4, with the exception of those related to education. *N* provides the number of observations.

	Years of		
	education		Bias index
Moderator		Investment bias index	
a_m	0.2300	a_c	0.0120
	0.010		0.118
c_m	-0.1300	alpha_c	-0.0364
	0.010		0.102
e_m	0.1100	a_u	0.3620
	0.000		0.106
		alpha_u	0.3455
			0.096
		C_C	-0.1190
			0.153
		chi_c	0.1855
			0.136
		c_u	0.0180
			0.203
		chi_u	-0.1828
			0.202
		е_с	0.0290
			0.058
		epsilon_c	-0.0393
			0.101
		е_с	0.9830
			0.058
		epsilon_u	0.0697
			0.047
Ν		11,800	

<sup>(</sup>footnote continued)

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